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Abstract 
Low pay poses issues for managers internationally. We examine productivity in low-paying 
sectors in Britain, since the National Minimum Wage’s (NMW) introduction. We use a 
multiple channel analytical strategy, emphasising the wage-incentives channel and linking it to 
a model of unobserved productivity. We estimate firm-specific productivity measures and 
aggregate them to the level of low-paying sectors. Difference-in-differences analysis illustrates 
that the NMW positively affected aggregate low-paying sector productivity. These findings 
highlight increased wages’ incentive effects with implications for management practice and 
public policy since ‘living’ wages may be productivity enhancing. 
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The UK National Minimum Wage’s impact on productivity 
 
1 Introduction 
We examine the National Minimum Wage’s impact on productivity, building on the BJM’s 
first virtual edition: employee responses to changing work practices (Frynas and Croucher, 
2015). Managing wages at the bottom of the distribution and the relationship between 
efficiency and equity are increasing concerns for managers and governments internationally. 
Debates around the recent introduction of a national minimum wage in Germany, discussions 
of the level of state and federal minima in the USA, calls for a European minimum wage and 
low pay concerns in MNC supply chains pose significant issues for managers. So, too, do 
British calls for organisations voluntarily to implement ‘living wages’ (Atkinson, 2015). 
Meanwhile, productivity concerns preoccupy British commentators (Ibid). Yet evidence on the 
minimum wage-productivity link is scarce and inconclusive. Existing studies (e.g., Galindo-
Rueda and Pereira, 2004; Croucher and Rizov, 2012; Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2015) use 
labour productivity measures and industry level data (Forth and O’Mahony, 2003). The 
NMW’s impact on total factor productivity has not previously been explicitly studied with 
micro data. However, some recent indirect evidence on wages, employment, and profits in the 
UK (Bernini and Riley, 2015) and case studies in the USA (Hirsch et al., 2015) suggest that 
minimum wages may raise total factor productivity. 
In the UK, minimum wages’ impact on firms has commonly been studied from neo-
classical perspectives. Wage increases raise firms’ marginal costs, inducing them to reduce 
mark-ups (e.g., Galindo-Rueda and Pereira, 2004; Draca et al., 2011; Riley and Rosazza-
Bondibene, 2015), making firms appear less productive. However, firms experiencing high 
factor costs may pass some on as higher output prices, fully compensating for mark-ups 
(Wadsworth, 2010). The extent of labour market competition also has important implications 
for input prices and productivity (Dickens et al., 1999; Machin and Manning, 1994). For large 
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(monopsonistic) firms, minimum wages can reduce marginal costs, increasing demand for 
labour in turn increasing output and, possibly, productivity. In competitive labour markets, 
minimum wages will bring higher costs; capital-for-labour substitution would be the prevailing 
adjustment mechanism, leading possibly to productivity improvements (Machin and Manning, 
1994). Clearly, neo-classical models’ predictions depend on assumptions influenced by market 
conditions.   
We investigate the issues from an alternative, behavioural stance. 1  Several early 
theoretical studies on the implications of efficiency wages link wage increases and higher 
productivity (e.g., Salop, 1979; Lazear, 1981, Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). In related but more 
behaviourally-focused frameworks, Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), and Levine 
(1991) argue that perceived reciprocity and fairness affect workers’ productivity. Fair wage-
effort theory (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) suggests that when workers receive less than the wage 
they ‘deserve’, they reduce effort. In determining their ‘fair wage’, individuals compare 
themselves with others dependent on market conditions, resulting in relative reductions in wage 
differentials. Levine (1991) argues that reducing wage dispersion can increase work team 
cohesiveness, promoting productivity. We use these arguments in developing our analytic 
strategy.  
The UK’s introduction of the NMW constitutes a relevant natural experiment. We 
propose that introducing a minimum wage improved incentives and thus productivity either 
through efficiency wage mechanisms or by aligning real and fair wages. We model the link 
between total factor productivity (TFP) and the NMW in a novel way using a structural 
productivity estimation approach based on Olley and Pakes (1996). Previous studies relating 
productivity to the NMW employ a two-step analysis where in the first step productivity is 
                                                 
1 Lester (1964) offered the first institutional-behavioural explanation of minimum wage effects on labour market 
outcomes. Kaufman (2010) and Hirsch et al. (2015) extend Lester’s ideas, proposing a multiple channels of 
adjustment approach.  
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estimated without controlling for the NMW’s effects and then, in a second step, the NMW’s 
association with the productivity measures is analysed. The productivity measures estimated 
in the first step are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. Our approach explicitly models 
the unobserved productivity and directly incorporates the effects of the NMW into an integrated 
semiparametric estimation algorithm. Our analysis therefore generates robust empirical 
evidence on the relationship between NMW’s introduction and improved productivity over 
time.  
 
2 Selective literature review 
Numerous studies on minimum wage effects use neo-classical economics models. Effects on 
employment and wage distributions have been extensively studied in the USA (e.g., Card and 
Krueger, 1994; 1995; DiNardo et al., 1996; Katz and Krueger, 1992; Lee, 1999; Slonimczyk 
and Skott, 2012; Hirsch et al., 2015) and in the UK (e.g., Dickens et al., 1999; Georgiadis, 2013; 
Machin and Manning, 1994; 2004; Machin et al., 2003; Metcalf, 2002; 2008; Stewart, 2002; 
2004; Riley and Rosazza-Bondibene, 2015). Consensus exists that the overall effect on 
employment is neutral, and accompanies (modest) wage distribution compression. Recently, 
Bernini and Riley (2015) and Hirsch et al. (2015) both concluded that minimum wage-induced 
adjustments through channels identified by neo-classical models are relatively insignificant. 
They suggest that institutional-behavioural models could have more explanatory power. 2  
Grimshaw (2013) advances similar views. 
Therefore, our focus is on wage incentive effects, which have been central in identifying 
sources of increasing productivity at firm and wider economy level. Economists have 
developed efficiency wage (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and labour extraction function (Bowles, 
                                                 
2 Hirsch et al. (2015) argue that all three main labour market models (competitive, monopsony, and institutional-
behavioural) capture important elements regarding adjustment effects, making comparison and empirical 
discrimination difficult.  
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1985) models, where wages and monitoring levels are traded off to elicit workers’ effort.3 
Wages are set above the market clearing wage, creating incentives increased worker effort due 
to the increased opportunity costs of finding another job.4  
Another related but theoretically distinct set of models posits that social norms and 
comparisons are important for workers. In Akerlof (1982), workers and employers create 
implicit gift exchange relationships, which are more valuable for incumbent workers and 
employers than external options, thus inducing higher effort and productivity. Akerlof and 
Yellen’s (1990) model is particularly relevant for low-paid contexts: through comparisons with 
a reference group, workers conceive of a fair wage, which if above the actual wage results in 
reduced effort and productivity; at wage levels above the fair wage no productivity effect arises. 
Their argument draws on observations of behaviour consistent with psychologists’ equity 
theory (Adams, 1963) and sociologists’ social exchange theory (Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964). 
In both theoretical constructs, equity notions are crucial and are generally strongly empirically 
supported. When workers perceive their wages as fair they are more proactive and willing to 
participate in company affairs (Levine, 1993). Perceived fairness in the presence of appropriate 
group norms promotes labour force cohesiveness and synergies (Cartwright, 1968; Beal et al., 
2003) potentially producing monitoring savings.  
Selecting the most appropriate reference group in a perceived fairness/equity 
comparison remains a contested endeavour. Using equity theory (Adams, 1965) as the 
underlying framework requires individuals to decide if they are being rewarded equitably by 
comparing their inputs and outputs with those of others. Here, both rewards and productive 
                                                 
3 Georgiadis (2013) tests a shirking model within efficiency wage theory by studying the NMW’s impact on the 
UK’s care home industry. In his framework NMW generates an increase in the average wage in an organisation 
which results in reduced supervision costs, and by implication increased productivity.  
4 Unemployment has been seen as a crucial component of the efficiency wage incentive scheme to work. However, 
Brown et al. (2012) show that even without unemployment the incentive structure remains effective. Higher wages 
induced by competition for labour bring higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity – a channel suggested by 
Akerlof (1982) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). . 
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contributions matter. Relative deprivation theory (Davis, 1959; Crosby, 1976) proposes a 
referential framework based only on rewards comparisons. The implications for suitable 
reference groups are quite different. Following equity theory, employees compare themselves 
with similarly skilled and productive individuals, whereas relative deprivation theory suggests 
that individuals are sensitive to pay differentials with dissimilar groups. Reconciling these 
theories in the context of a large set of occupations, Dornstein (1988:233) stipulates that 
employee comparisons are made “first and foremost with those in the same or in similar 
occupations outside the organization.” This finding reflects high sensitivity towards overall 
market trends in pay.5 In the case of low paid workers in Britain, dual labour market theory 
also suggests that workers in the ‘secondary’ segment are strongly oriented towards external 
labour markets (Riley and Szivas, 2003). Empirical studies confirm the proposition (May et al., 
2010).   
Another complexity arising from within-firm reference groups derives from 
information (signals) effects of wage comparisons, which may be stronger than comparison 
(status) effects. Simply put, in such a scenario we would expect that workers are happier the 
more others earn, i.e., the more wages are dispersed. Some studies have indeed uncovered a 
positive well-being effect from others’ income (e.g., Senik 2004; Kingdon and Knight, 2007; 
Clark et al., 2009). Potentially counter-intuitive, this finding has been explained by reference 
to Hirschman’s tunnel effect (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973), which stipulates that others’ 
good fortunes create expectations in observers. Clearly, such arguments apply to occupations 
with steep wage profiles and are less relevant to low-pay sectors where career progression 
prospects are limited. Thus, fair wage considerations arguably rely more on status rather than 
signal effects. The balance between status and signal is driven by the strength of the correlation 
                                                 
5 Experimental literature often considers ‘vertical’ comparisons, between workers and employers (see Fehr et al., 
2009), however, the importance of ‘horizontal’ comparisons is recognised (e.g., Clark and Senik, 2010; Bartling 
and von Siemens, 2011) as suggested by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 
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between a reference group’s income and a worker’s future earnings. As Clark et al. (2009) 
suggest, at occupational peer group or geographic level, the correlation is expected to be small. 
A discernible status effect is thus arguably far greater when reference groups within the same 
firm are avoided. 
Both efficiency and fair wage theories have important implications for market 
equilibrium. Efficiency wage theory implies higher wages paid by firms to targeted worker 
groups. If firms are heterogeneous there will be a distribution of wages where firms that find 
shirking particularly costly will offer higher wages to identical workers than other firms 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Nevertheless, depending on labour market conditions 
(unemployment levels, monitoring costs, turnover) efficiency wage theory motivates rightward 
shifts in the firm wage distribution. Fair-wage-effort theory in turn implies wage distribution 
compression (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Levine, 1991), which would usually also be associated 
with increases in the average wage. If firms must pay a high wage to some workers – perhaps 
those in short supply – pay equity demands will raise wages for other workers in the firm.6  
Both theories suggest that some market interventions could be Pareto efficient. In the 
context of their efficiency wage model, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984, p.434) argue that “in some 
circumstances wage subsidies are desirable”, for example to curtail excessive labour turnover. 
To maintain egalitarianism and cohesiveness firms must also pay an efficiency wage to the 
lower end of their wage distribution to reduce the firm wage differential. Left to the market, 
these higher wages will be under-provided in equilibrium. Levine (1991) concludes that 
policies affecting either prices (e.g., minimum wage) or quantities (e.g., labour mobility 
restrictions) can increase efficiency in economies.  
 
                                                 
6 Falk et al. (2005) show that temporary introduction of a minimum wage brings rises in subjects’ reservation 
wages, which persists after the minimum wage has been removed. Thus, economic policy may affect behaviours 
by shaping perceptions of fair transactions and creating entitlement effects. 
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3 The NMW’s bite 
Our analytical strategy comprises two stages – estimation and validation. First, we estimate 
firm level (total factor) productivity based on the Olley and Pakes (1996) semiparametric 
algorithm, modified to directly account for the NMW incentives effects while controlling for 
technology, input decisions, selection and market conditions. Second, we apply commonly 
used difference-in-differences analysis to validate and illustrate NMW effects on productivity, 
and, to facilitate interpretation, on wages and capital-labour ratios at the level of individual 
low-paying sectors. 
 
3.1 Identification at the productivity estimation stage 
We, first identify the NMW’s observable bite on wage distributions at firm and industry levels. 
Next, we directly account for the effects through a measure of the bite in the production 
function estimation algorithm, controlling for other technology and market factors. We thereby 
capture ceteris paribus the NMW’s incentives-driven effects on (total factor) productivity.  
To identify the effects we use data for average wages at firm level.7 The NMW’s bite 
observed as an average wage increase may derive from three channels as discussed by Lee 
(1999) who formally models the relationship between the minimum wage’s bite and observed 
wage distributions in the USA. First, there may be no spillovers and no disemployment, which 
represents the censoring case. The only NMW effect is to raise the wages of those initially 
earning less than the minimum, implying compression of the wage distribution. A second 
channel is characterised by spillovers but no disemployment, occurring when the NMW affects 
higher percentiles; at the (unlikely) extreme, there may be no wage distribution compression 
but a rightward shift of the whole distribution. A third channel represents truncation: no 
                                                 
7 We use the large FAME data rather than more detailed private micro surveys. FAME is a large and highly 
representative dataset for firms in UK industries. A detailed description of FAME is provided in Section 5. 
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spillovers but full disemployment. Here, the NMW has no impact on workers with wages 
already above the minimum, and causes job loss for those earning below it, implying wage 
distribution compression. Any of these channels or a combination would lead to an observed 
increase in the average firm wage. Clearly, the (net) incentives effect obtained would confine 
‘standard’ efficiency wage and fair wage forces.8  
The effect’s magnitude depends on the initial firm wage distribution. For firms for 
which shirking is costly and which have unilaterally opted to pay higher wages, the NMW’s 
impact on the average firm wage would be negligible. The NMW’s impact on the average wage 
in firms where the share of low pay workers is minimal will also be negligible. These inferences 
have important implications for the industry wage distribution’s behaviour. Clearly, at industry 
level, on NMW inception (or upgrading), there will be larger increases in low wage firms’ 
average wages, on the distribution’s left side.9 Compression of the industry wage distribution 
from below will result. We measure the extent of the compression, which represents the 
observed NMW’s bite following Lee (1999), through the tenth-fiftieth percentile (log) wage 
differential.  
There are two important advantages in considering the industry (average firm) wage 
distribution in deriving our measure of the NMW’s bite. First, the compression of the industry 
wage distribution will capture both efficiency and fair wage effects within firms. Further, for 
low-paid workers who have flat wage profiles and predominantly rely on horizontal 
comparisons, the appropriate reference group would be the industry median. Thus, the 
compression of the industry wage distribution would capture an important incentives effect at 
                                                 
8 To separately identify efficiency wage and fair wage effects we need information on unavailable within-firm 
wage distribution. 
9 Draca et al. (2011) identify stronger NMW effects in lower average-wage firms compared with higher average-
wage ones. They verify that the threshold of £12,000 is appropriate for the UK (FAME) sample by extensively 
experimenting with the threshold cut-off and examining segregation and average wages in an alternative dataset 
- WERS. We also tested the relationship between average wage change and initial average wage in 1995/96 and 
1998/99 and found, similar to Draca et al. (2011) and Machin et al. (2003) that in the earlier period the relationship 
was often insignificant while around the NMW implementation period it was negative and significant. Our results 
at low-pay sector level are available on request.  
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occupational level, as suggested by fair-wage-effort theory. Second, by considering average 
wages relative to the industry median we can control for general, industry-wide wage shifts 
driven by non-NMW factors.10  
We indeed observe sectoral wage compression from below in our data.11 We calculate 
dispersion measures at homogeneous units formed at 4-digit SIC industries and the LPC’s firm-
size groups.12 Table 1 summarises dispersion measures for the LPC sectors with high NMW 
incidence and two composite counterfactuals for manufacturing (M) and services (S), 
respectively. Since its 1999 introduction, the NMW has increased in real terms and we, like 
others, find this is associated with reduced wage dispersion throughout the period; the reduction 
is very significant over the first three years for several LPC industries. For the majority of LPC 
industries no evidence of such reduction in dispersion existed before 1999.  
- Table 1 about here – 
 
3.2 Identification at the verification stage 
We verify and illustrate the NMW’s impact on aggregate productivity by difference-in-
differences analysis. We identify treatment and control groups of firms within the low-pay 
sectors based on average wage information from FAME. Athey and Imbens (2006) show that 
when the distributions of treatment and control groups are the same a simple means difference-
in-differences estimator is consistent. In selecting firms for our treatment and control groups 
                                                 
10 An important condition for the median wage change being a good control for non-NMW factors is that the 
NMW does not impact the median. It is reasonable to assume that the condition holds and studies for the USA 
(e.g., Di Nardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999) and the UK (e.g., Machin et al., 2003; Draca et al., 2011) demonstrate that 
the spillovers from the NMW on the (occupational) wage distribution are limited to the area around the NMW 
level and do not exceed the median.  
11 We have checked the evolution of the fiftieth-ninetieth percentile of (log)wage differentials over time for all 
low pay sectors and found that those were stable suggesting that the NMW’s impact did not spill over beyond the 
low pay segment. These results are available from the authors. 
12 To better control for factors such as market conditions, work group norms, labour management practices, and 
compliance, we divide our sectoral samples by firm size into large, medium and small categories. 
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we are guided by this condition, which implies that for the control group to constitute a valid 
counterfactual two equivalent conditions - common trends and a stable composition of the two 
groups – must be satisfied (Blundell et al., 2004). Furthermore, we follow Draca et al. (2011) 
who used the same dataset and conducted extensive robustness analysis of the two conditions. 
We replicated Draca et al. (2011)’s tests with our data and confirmed the trends and 
counterfactuals; the test results are available from the authors.  
The treatment group (T=1) includes low-wage firms with an average annual wage of 
less than £12,000 over the three years prior to the NMW’s introduction in April 1999. The 
control group (T=0) contains similar firms but with an average annual wage between £12,000 
and £24,000, close to our samples’ median firm wage.13 Firms with higher average wages are 
quite different and therefore subject to different unobserved trends compared to the treatment 
(and control) group firms. We expect that wages of firms below the cut-off point will 
experience a significant boost from the NMW introduction relative to higher wage firms. 
Furthermore, we evaluate effects before (NMW=0) and after (NMW=1) the NMW introduction, 
in an aggregate of all LPC sectors, separate aggregates of manufacturing and service sectors, 
and by individual LPC sectors; detailed results are available on request. Thus, the unconditional 




𝑇=1 ) − (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=1
𝑇=0 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=0
𝑇=0 ).   (1) 
To facilitate interpretation of results we also apply equation (1) to aggregate wages 
(ln(w)) to verify the NMW’s impact on the sectoral wage distribution and to aggregate capital-
labour (K/L) ratios to examine possible technology adjustments as an alternative source of 
productivity change.  
                                                 
13 Several studies on the NMW’s impact on firms using FAME data, notably Draca et al. (2011) and Riley and 
Rosazza-Bondibene (2015) apply similar identification strategies and select the cut-off point of £12,000 after 
experimenting with different cut-offs. In this analysis, we also experimented with £10,000 and £14,000 cut-
offs .The results were qualitatively similar albeit less pronounced.  
11 
 
Furthermore, we also create alternative manufacturing (M) and services (S) sector 
composite counterfactuals outside the low-pay sectors where firms are probably unaffected by 
the NMW’s introduction. This additional analytic dimension supports our conclusions. 
 
4 Model of productivity and estimation algorithm 
Following the productivity literature summarised in Ackerberg et al. (2007) we first specify a 
Cobb–Douglas production function, 
),( kl jtjtjtjt KLY
 ,         (2) 
where j and t indicate firm and time, respectively. Y represents output (often measured as value 
added); L and K represent the common inputs used in production, labour and physical capital 
respectively. The β values are the factor shares of the production inputs. The index 
jt  is a 
measure of total factor productivity (TFP) of firm j at time t. Olley and Pakes (1996) formulate 
a model of the (unobserved) TFP as a function of the firm’s state variables (capital K and age 
A) and a control variable (investment I), which is monotonically related to unobserved 
productivity. The model is derived by inverting the firm investment demand function, which is 
a solution to the firm profit maximisation problem.  
Following our identification strategy and modelling ideas developed in Ackerberg et al. 
(2007), we extend the Olley-Pakes TFP model with the wage dispersion measure, NMWit (i 
denotes industry-firm-size units) constructed as discussed in section 3.1 capturing the NMW’s 
incentives impact on firm productivity. The wage dispersion here acts as a second control 
variable which, as discussed above, should be inversely (and monotonically) associated with 
unobserved productivity. Market environment characteristics that the firm faces are also 
controlled for by a vector R

, containing geographic, sector, and time specific effects. The TFP 





        (3) 
The original Olley-Pakes formulation allows market environment factors to change 
longitudinally, although they are assumed constant across firms in a given period. Here, we 
extend the model by using an explicit measure of the NMW’s incentives impact on firms and 
a vector of other market environment controls. Thus, the information content of the state space 
would vary by narrowly-defined location and firm-size group within 4-digit SIC industries and 
longitudinally. Since we deflate value added and capital with industry-wide deflators, 
introducing market environment controls in the TFP model helps control for the fact that output 
and factor prices might differ across firm types and/or evolve differently longitudinally.  
The treatment of the TFP leads to an estimating equation of the production function 
resembling a multilevel modelling approach. Following Olley and Pakes (1996), we estimate 
a log-linear transformation of the Cobb-Douglas production function (equation 2), 
incorporating the TFP model (equation 3):  
jtjtjtljtajtkjt laky   0 .      (4) 
Small letters represent the respective variables’ natural logarithms; β-coefficients represent the 
elasticity of output (value added) with respect to inputs; 
jt  is unobserved productivity and η 
is the (iid) error term. As in Olley and Pakes (1996), we include firm age in the specification 
to control for managerial and technology differences, and cohort effects on firm productivity, 
which improves the coefficient estimates’ precision.  
Because productivity 
jt  (as defined in equation 3) is not observed directly in the data, 
estimating equation (4) is affected by simultaneity and selection biases. Simultaneity means 
that if more productive firms tend to hire more workers because of higher current and 
anticipated future productivity, an OLS estimator will provide upwardly-biased estimates on 
the input coefficients. Selection occurs because exit depends on productivity as well as on state 
variables (capital and age). Thus, the coefficient on capital is likely to be underestimated by 
13 
 
OLS as higher capital stocks allow firms to survive at lower productivity levels, implying a 
negative relationship between capital and 
jt  (Olley and Pakes, 1996).  
To control for these biases, Olley and Pakes (1996) developed a two-stage 
semiparametric estimation algorithm using a non-parametric control function of productivity. 
Following Olley and Pakes, equation (4) can be re-written as:  
jtjtjtitjttjtljtajtkjt akrnmwihlaky   ),,,,(0

.   (5) 
In equation (5) the productivity function ωjt = ht(.) is treated non-parametrically using a 
polynomial (we use a 3rd-degree polynomial throughout). The non-parametric treatment, 
however, results in collinearity and requires the constant, kjt and ajt terms to be combined into 
a function ),,,,( jtjtitjtt akrnmwi

  such that equation (5) becomes: 
jtjtjtitjttjtljt akrnmwily   ),,,,(

.      (6) 
Equation (6) represents the first stage of the estimation algorithm and is estimated by OLS. 
In the first stage, only the labour coefficient is identified while capital and age 
coefficients are identified in the algorithm’s second stage. An estimate jtˆ  is also obtained for 
use in the second stage where ωjt is expressed as  
jtajtkjtjt ak   0
ˆˆ .         (7) 
The first stage is unaffected by endogenous selection because the function 
t  fully controls for 
the unobservable affecting firm’s choices; by construction 
jt  represents unobservable factors 
unknown by the firm when making investment and exit decisions. In contrast, the estimation 
algorithm’s second stage is affected by endogenous selection because the exit decision in 
period t depends directly on ωjt. 
To clarify the timing of production decisions, jt  can be decomposed into its 
conditional expectation given the information about productivity known by the firm in the t-1 
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period and a residual: 
jtjtjtjtjtjt gE    )(]|[ 11 . By construction, jt  is 
uncorrelated with information in t-1 and thus with kjt and ajt which are determined prior to time 
t. The firm’s exit decision in period t depends directly on 
jt  and thus the decision will be 
correlated with 
jt .
14 To account for endogenous selection on productivity the g(.) function can 
be extended with survival information. 
jtjtjtjt Pg    )
ˆ,(' 1 ,        (8) 
where jtPˆ  is the survival propensity score which controls for the impact of selection on the 
expectation of 
jt , i.e., firms with lower survival propensity which survive to time t likely 
have higher 
jt ’s than those with higher survival propensity. jtPˆ  is estimated semi-
parametrically using a Probit model with a polynomial approximation.  
The capital and age coefficients are identified in the algorithm’s second stage. 
Equations (8) and (7) are substituted into equation (5) leading to: 
,),ˆ(' 111 jtjtjtajtkjtjtajtkjtljt Pakgakly   

   (9) 
where the two 0  terms have been encompassed into the non-parametric function g’(.) and jt  
is a composite error term comprised of 
jt  and jt . The lagged 1
ˆ
jt  variable is obtained from 
the first stage estimates at the t-1 period. Equation (9) is estimated by a non-linear least squares 
(NLLS) search routine approximating g’(.) with a polynomial. 
In sum, in the algorithm’s first stage we estimate the labour coefficient, lˆ  by OLS 
while the capital, kˆ  coefficient (as well as the age coefficient) is estimated in the second stage 
                                                 
14 This correlation relies assumes that firms exit the market quickly, in the same period as the decision is made. If 
exit was decided in the period before actual exit, then although there is attrition per se, exit would be uncorrelated 
with jt  and there will be no selection bias. 
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by NLLS. We use the production function coefficients kˆ  and lˆ  consistently estimated to 
back out unbiased firm-specific TFP measures, calculated as: 
jtljtkjtjtjtajtjt lkyaTFP 
ˆˆ  .     (10) 
Our TFP measure captures the NMW’s effects on firm productivity while accounting for 
possible technology changes through capital for labour substitutions and selection due to firm 
exits.  
 
5 Data and estimation results 
5.1 Data 
We estimate the production functions specified above using the FAME dataset, covering all 
firms filed at Companies House. Information on firm-level financial statements, remuneration 
costs, ownership structure, and location is used. The data contain annual records for over 
360,000 firms, for the period 1995-2008. The data’s coverage is highly representative 
compared to aggregate statistics for the industries analysed as reported by the UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS); for employment, it is approximately 82 per cent. The sectors 
analysed are identified following LPC groupings of low-paying industries at 4-digit SIC level. 
We also create counterfactuals from manufacturing and service non-LPC industries: 
composites of a set of 4-digit industries identified in LFS and WERS as having high levels of 
pay, high employee skills, high unionisation and hence minimal use of the NMW in-company, 
as evidenced in successive LPC reports.15 All nominal monetary variables are converted into 
real values by deflating with the appropriate 4-digit SIC deflators taken from ONS. We use PPI 
to deflate sales and materials costs, and asset price deflators for capital and fixed investment 
variables. 
                                                 
15 The 4-digit industries included in the counterfactuals came from the following 2-digit SIC industries: 23, 27, 
29, 33, 34, 35, 40 for the manufacturing counterfactual and 64, 65, 66, 67 for the services counterfactual. In 
selecting counterfactuals, we were guided by LFS and LPC statistics in estimating NMW exposure.  
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We seek to estimate an unbiased and consistent TFP measure at firm level, capturing 
the NMW’s incentive effects, and to document the evolution of aggregate productivity. The 
strategy implies running regressions within all 4-digit low-paying and counterfactual industries. 
After lags are applied and missing values deleted, over 160,000 observations remain. The 
estimated samples within individual LPC sectors account for between 52 and 70 per cent of 
employment. The correlations between the ONS aggregate statistics series and the estimated 
sample series are: sales – 0.90 to 0.96; employment – 0.90 to 0.97. Descriptive statistics 
calculated from the estimated FAME samples within LPC sectors and the counterfactuals are 
reported in Table 2.  
- Table 2 about here – 
 
5.2 Productivity estimation results 
Table 3 summarises the aggregated coefficients on labour and capital for LPC sectors and the 
non-LPC counterfactuals. The aggregated coefficients are weighted averages of the estimated 
industry coefficients using numbers of employees as weightings. Differences exist across LPC 
sectors with respect to capital and labour elasticities, especially between manufacturing and 
services. The coefficient on labour ranges between 0.50 and 0.94 and is highest in service 
industries. The capital coefficient ranges between 0.09 and 0.30 and is lowest in social care 
and leisure.  
Table 3 also reports means of the aggregated productivity measure calculated from the 
Olley-Pakes (TFP) models and a labour productivity (LP) measure; the two appear broadly 
comparable. The sectors with highest aggregate productivity by the TFP measure are security 
and retail; social care shows the lowest productivity. 
- Table 3 about here – 
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Our TFP estimates are designed to capture the NMW’s productivity impact. A simple 
way to demonstrate this is to calculate elasticities of productivity with respect to the NMW 
longitudinally for the aggregate of LPC sectors, for separate aggregates of manufacturing and 
service sectors and by individual LPC sector. We find that the NMW had a positive impact on 
aggregate productivity in low-paying sectors. The elasticity of aggregate productivity with 
respect to the NMW is around 1; the productivity of service sectors is twice as sensitive as that 
of manufacturing to NMW increases; across individual LPC sectors substantial heterogeneity 
exists (see Table 3, bottom row). The high impact in services may derive from the greater 
productivity significance of labour rather than capital inputs in those industries.   
 
5.3 Difference-in-differences analysis 
Given our strategy to control for all relevant factors at the productivity estimation stage, we 
obtain firm specific TFP measures that capture all relevant effects. Therefore, we follow an 
unconditional difference-in-differences approach (equation 1) and the identification strategy 
from Section 3.2, which is similar to several other NMW studies. The difference-in-differences 
results are reported in Tables 4-6. In each table’s upper panel we verify for all samples (total 
sample aggregate A, manufacturing M and services S) that compared to T=0 wages rise by 
more in T=1, after 1999. Stronger wage effects exist for the treatment groups. In addition, we 
note our results on the changes over time in the magnitude of sectoral tenth-fiftieth-percentile 
wage differentials reported in Table 1, showing a decline after 1999. The two results suggest 
that potential effects on productivity of the treatment group firms can be attributed to the 
NMW’s bite, creating in-firm significant incentive effects. To check our results’ robustness we 
also use counterfactuals (A, M, and S) containing firms from (non-LPC) industries where the 
NMW’s bite is weak and where therefore effects on wages and productivity will also probably 
be weaker. The empirical findings confirm our expectations. 
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Results for the NMW’s TFP effects are reported in the second panel of Tables 4 to 6.16 
Our findings are consistent across individual LPC sectors, for which the results are available 
from the authors. Firms in the treatment groups experienced relative increases in productivity, 
during the period 1999–2008. The effects are statistically significant in all sectors except 
hairdressing, leisure and agriculture. In these industries, compliance levels are comparatively 
low as they employ high proportions of women and (undocumented) migrant workers shown 
to be especially susceptible to under-payment and to worker-employer complicity in that regard 
(Ipsos MORI, 2012; Le Roux et al., 2013; Bloch and McKay, 2015). Besides, the non-effect in 
agriculture is likely due to the Agricultural Wage Board’s wage-fixing throughout the period 
of investigation. The largest relative increases in productivity are in large firms in the 
aggregated total and in the aggregated service sector samples. In manufacturing, relative 
productivity increases are also large for medium-size firms. 
- Tables 4 to 6 about here - 
In Tables 4 to 6 (third panel), we report the capital-labour (K/L) ratio. Changes in the 
ratio may reflect technology adjustments, which can be seen as alternative and long-term NMW 
effects. In estimating our TFP measure we control for technology changes (and survival bias). 
In hospitality and social care, productivity improvements indeed appear to be affected by 
substitution of capital for labour to a higher degree compared with other LPC, mostly 
manufacturing, sectors. For the aggregate services sample, some evidence exists of substitution 
of capital for labour in low-paying sectors while in the non-LPC counterfactual sample such 
evidence is absent.17 
                                                 
16 The results by Croucher and Rizov (2012) based on labour productivity measures are similar to those reported. 
17 In a short-run (robustness) analysis, covering 2000-2002, we found the capital for labour substitution effect was 
much weaker and statistically insignificant, while increases in wages and productivity in the treatment groups 
were significant albeit smaller in magnitude than in the long run. These findings are consistent with Falk et al.’s 




An alternative explanation is firm exit. In Table 2, we reported exit rates by LPC sector 
for 1998, 2002, and 2008, i.e. just before, three and nine years after NMW implementation. 
Over the first three years, exit rates do not seem to change compared to 1998. By 2008 however, 
in sectors with relative productivity gains where capital-for-labour substitution is weaker, exit 
rates were somewhat higher, apparently supporting the argument that less productive firms exit 
in the long run. In estimating our TFP productivity measure we control for survival bias.  
 
6 Conclusion 
We empirically evaluated the NMW impact on firm and sector productivity using a multiple 
channel of adjustment analytical framework, emphasising the behavioural perspective. Our 
analytical strategy was to account for the NMW’s impact on incentives and productivity, 
recognising that multiple channels generate the net effect, controlling for factors identified by 
previous studies. Previous studies did not account for the NMW’s impact in the productivity 
estimation algorithm. Our contribution is that while others have analysed profitability (Draca 
et al., 2015) and wages, employment, and labour productivity impacts (e.g., Riley et al, 2015) 
from neo-classical viewpoints, we show the value of a behavioural and broader social science 
theoretical perspective in addressing productivity effects. We thereby confirm and demonstrate 
the incentives created by the NMW suggested by Bernini and Riley (2015) and Hirsch et al. 
(2015) to be an important channel of adjustment.  
We show improvements in total factor productivity in low-paying sectors after 1999. 
We also demonstrate substantial heterogeneity across and within sectors, and between firm size 
groups. Positive effects are strongest in larger firms. While compatible with possible pass-
through and mark-up effects in firms with more monopoly power (Wadsworth, 2010), the result 
may be taken to reflect more sophisticated labour management practices and high levels of 
NMW compliance (Le Roux et al., 2013) since ‘micro’ and small firms typically have 
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fragmented and reactive management practices (Cagliano et al., 2001). In theoretical terms, our 
results support Hirsch et al.’s (2015) framework envisaging multiple channels of adjustment to 
minimum wage impact; besides the main wage-incentives effect, we find some evidence of 
technological change and attrition as potential sources of productivity improvements. We thus 
position our model not as a replacement for others, but as an alternative.  
Our analysis has implications for managers, who may not have grasped potential 
productivity benefits (Luce, 2004). Similarly, small firm strategies focused on staying ‘below 
the radar’ to avoid NMW compliance may not always be appropriate. We do not argue that 
employers should simply pay a ‘living wage’ to raise employee incentives. This would be 
simplistic since non-financial factors also count to low-paid workers (Elfani, 2014). For 
national policy makers, we provide retrospective justification for the upward trend in minimum 
wages for the decade following inception.  
Our results thus highlight a behavioural perspective’s utility. Beyond implications for 
management practice, our findings also speak to contemporary wage policy discussions, not 
least since ‘living wages’ may also enhance productivity. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1996 - -0.76 -0.80 -0.82 -1.01 -0.86 -0.57 -0.80 -1.00 -0.75 -1.02 -0.38 -0.88 
1997 - -0.78 -0.78 -0.84 -1.02 -0.85 -0.66 -0.90 -1.02 -0.76 -1.00 -0.36 -0.92 
1998 - -0.76 -0.77 -0.82 -1.06 -0.84 -0.58 -0.82 -0.96 -0.75 -1.02 -0.42 -0.90 
1999 3.90 -0.77 -0.75 -0.75 -1.02 -1.07 -0.59 -0.78 -0.90 -0.67 -0.96 -0.41 -0.94 
2000 3.97 -0.75 -0.72 -0.71 -0.96 -0.95 -0.52 -0.70 -0.91 -0.58 -0.92 -0.43 -0.95 
2001 4.35 -0.68 -0.64 -0.62 -0.84 -0.74 -0.56 -0.63 -0.90 -0.45 -0.92 -0.45 -0.96 
2002 4.40 -0.68 -0.60 -0.57 -0.79 -0.59 -0.54 -0.59 -0.88 -0.38 -0.89 -0.42 -0.95 
2003 4.65 -0.67 -0.60 -0.61 -0.77 -0.70 -0.44 -0.52 -0.87 -0.37 -0.88 -0.48 -0.94 
2004 4.95 -0.60 -0.61 -0.58 -0.82 -0.70 -0.48 -0.50 -0.87 -0.36 -0.89 -0.46 -0.98 
2005 5.05 -0.62 -0.62 -0.60 -0.87 -0.71 -0.54 -0.51 -0.92 -0.40 -0.93 -0.45 -0.97 
2006 5.23 -0.64 -0.63 -0.58 -0.86 -0.80 -0.58 -0.51 -0.91 -0.44 -0.92 -0.42 -0.98 
2007 5.27 -0.61 -0.65 -0.58 -0.85 -0.84 -0.57 -0.55 -0.85 -0.40 -0.92 -0.45 -1.00 
2008 5.28 -0.53 -0.64 -0.61 -0.86 -0.74 -0.57 -0.60 -0.77 -0.37 -0.89 -0.45 -1.00 




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 

































































































































Shares             
Exits 1998 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Exits 2002 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Exits 2008 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Urban 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.44 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.93 
Rural less 
sparse 
0.09 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.52 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 
Rural sparse 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of 
observations 
5156 70668 22019 3491 935 1864 8232 13408 10169 24665 15325 30681 
Note: Unweighted means and standard deviations (s.d.) are reported for the monetary variables, employment and age. Counterfactual M comprises the non-LPC 




































































Adj R2 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.92 










































































Note: The reported coefficients and aggregate productivity are weighted averages, using number of employees as weight, from 4-digit industry regressions on firm level data. 
The R2reported are from the last stage of the estimation algorithm. Standard errors (standard deviations for productivity) are reported in parentheses. Counterfactual M 





Table 4 Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, TFP, and K/L for the aggregate LPC sectors and counterfactual (A) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
















































































































































































































Table 4 Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 






































































































































































































Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences (DiD) and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity (TFP) or K/L ratio after 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. (T) denotes the 




Table 5 Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, TFP, and K/L for the manufacturing LPC sectors and counterfactual (M) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 










































































































































































































Table 5 Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 






































































































































































































Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences (DiD) and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity (TFP) or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1%; 




Table 6 Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, TFP, and K/L for the service LPC sectors and counterfactual (S) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 

















































































































































































































Table 6 Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 






































































































































































































Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences (DiD) and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity (TFP) or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1%; 
** 5%; * 10%. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. 
 
 
